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The So-Called Right to Privacy

Jamal Greene†
The constitutional right to privacy has been a conservative bugaboo ever
since Justice Douglas introduced it into the United States Reports in Griswold v.
Connecticut. Reference to the “so -called” right to privacy has become code for
the view that the right is doctrinally recognized but not in fact constitutionally
enshrined. This Article argues that the constitutional right to privacy is no more.
The two rights most associated historically with the right to privacy are abortion
and intimate sexual conduct, yet Gonzales v. Carhart and Lawrence v. Texas
made clear that neither of these rights is presently justified by its proponents on
the Court as aspects of constitutional privacy. Other rights that might be
protected by a constitutional right to privacy, such as the right to refuse medical
treatment or the right to assisted suicide, are either justified on liberty grounds or
are not constitutionally protected at all. The Court’s move from privacy to liberty
as a constitutional basis for the freedom to make fundamental life decisions
strengthens the rights themselves by anchoring them to constitutional text in a
text -happy era, and represents a victory for Justice Stevens, who has long
advocated such a shift.

Introduction
“Privacy” again?1 I’m afraid so, but I come to bury the benighted doctrine,
not to praise it. It lived a tough life. Its best deed —freeing millions of American
women from a Hobson’s choice2 —hardly went unpunished. Its father was
branded an incautious fabulist and a womanizer.3 Its size and scope were ever
changing, its very existence under attack even from its sympathizers. 4 As for its
enemies, they long ago took to name-calling. In a 1981 memo to Attorney
General William French Smith, a young Justice Department lawyer named John

†

Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; J.D., 2005, Yale Law School. The author
served as a law clerk to the Hon. John Paul Stevens during the October 2006 Supreme Court
Term. Thanks to Vaughn Blackman, Suzanne Goldberg, Elora Mukherjee, Andrew Siegel, Neil
Siegel, and the staff of the UC Davis Law Review for helpful comments and suggestions.
1
Cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14 , 81 HARV. L. RE V. 69, 69 (1967) (“‘State action’ again?”).
2
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3
See BRUCE ALLE N MURP H Y, WILD BIL L : THE L EGEND AND L IFE O F W ILL IAM O. DOUG L AS
(2003).
4
See generally WHAT R OE V . W ADE SHOULD H AVE S AID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (collecting
alternative, ostensibly better, Roe opinions from legal scholars).
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Roberts wrote of the “so -called ‘right to privacy’”;5 the same epithet appears in
the 1988 Justice Department Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation 6 and in
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas. 7
This Article argues that they protest too much. The doctrinal life of the
constitutional right to privacy is over. By that I do not mean that there is no
constitutional protection against unreasonable search or seizure or against
compelled disclosure of private information. These constitutional rights live on
under the rubric of the Fourth and First Amendments and are not the intended
targets of the long-running assault on the right to privacy. No r do I mean that the
privileges that the right to privacy has served to protect—paradigmatically the
rights to reproductive choice, including abortion, and to intimate sexual
relationships—no longer enjoy constitutional status. Plainly, they do. What I
mean, rather, is that those privileges no longer owe that status to any putative
right to privacy. The right to obtain an abortion is now conceptualized by its
defenders either in terms of women’s equality or, non -exclusively, as a specific
application of a constitutional liberty right to make fundamental life decisions.
The rights to use contraception and to participate in a consensual non-commercial
sexual relationship are also defended as aspects of the right to liberty protected
against state abridgement by the due process clause. The projects and activities
the right to privacy was crafted to protect owe it a debt of gratitude, but the right
to privacy as such has no clothes.
This should be cause for celebration among progressives and libertarians.
Privacy was never an apt moniker for the rights they have characteristically
sought to protect. It is not impossible to construct a theoretical account that
grounds a right to use contraception, to have an abortion, or to participate in
intimate sexual relationships in a right to “privacy,” but doing so invites the
troublesome corollary that the justice underlying these rights has anything at all to
do with publicity, information -sharing, or discretion more generally. As
importantly, the rights to equality and liberty can boast the textual hook that the
right to privacy has always coveted. Beyond the intrinsic satisfaction of grounding
constitutional rights in the text of the Constitution, this development has an
obvious political benefit. To the extent the conservative textualist movement that
Justice Scalia has pushed has won tactical turf battles over constitutional
methodology, locating a textual basis for rights previously described under the
privacy rubric beats back the infantry attack, even if it doesn’t quite win the war. 8

5

Memorandum from John Roberts to Att’y Gen. William French, Erwin Griswold
Correspondence (Dec. 11, 1981).
6
Off. of Legal Pol’y, Dept. of Just., Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation 8 (1988).
7
539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003).
8
The daunting but not insuperable enigma of “substantive” due process remains.
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Eroding privacy doctrine without eroding privacy rights also marks a
significant victory for the jurisprudence of Justice Stevens. He has long expressed
discomfort with the constitutional right to privacy, dating back to his tenure as a
Seventh Circuit judge, when he complained that classifying the r ight to make
fundamental life decisions as a “so -called right of marital privacy” was
“ unfortunate.”9 He reiterated that sentiment, more diplomatically, in his dissenting
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.1 0 When the Court finally overruled Bowers in
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy appeared to adopt Justice Stevens’s view, not once
referring to the right to engage in consensual same-sex sodomy as an aspect of a
constitutional right to privacy. 11
This Article describes the life and declares the death of the constitutio nal
right to privacy, with particular reference to the significant role Justice Stevens
played in its demise. Part I briefly chronicles the history of the right, from Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s celebrated recognition of the privacy tort in 1890,12
to Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut ,1 3 through its judicial
invocations in Griswold ’s progeny and Bowers, and at last to its conspicuous
absence in cases like Lawrence and Gonzales v. Carhart .14 This Part argues that
the gradual transformation of the right to make fundamental personal decisions
from an aspect of privacy emerging from the penumbrae of the Bill of Rights into
an aspect of constitutional liberty and equality protected by the due process clause
is now complete.
Part II locates the theoretical basis for that transformation within the
jurisprudence of Justice Stevens. From his foundational Seventh Circuit opinion
in Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 1 5 to his dissenting opinion in Bowers,
to his extrajudicial writings on the subject, Justice Stevens has long advocated an
emphasis on what he terms the “ liberty clause” of the Constitution in deciding
fundamental decision cases. This approach vindicates the concurring Griswold
opinions of Justices Harlan and White, though by affirming the rights to abortion
and to same-sex intimacy, the Court has decisively rejected their constitutional
conclusions and instead embraced the conclusions of Justice Stevens.
Part III explains why this doctrinal development is not only, as Justice
Stevens might say, eminently reasonable,16 but also makes good political sense.
9

Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716, 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 425
U.S. 916 (1976).
10
478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 -78.
12
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV . L. RE V. 193 (1890).
13
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
15
523 F.2d 716.
16
A favorite expression of his. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2779 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 776 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
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The right to privacy has become more symbol than substance. Its frequent
invocation in confirmation hearings is entirely out of proportion to its significance
in constitutional doctrine; it does no more than to signal, obliquely, comfort with
or hostility to the continuing validity of Roe v. Wade. 1 7 Partly in response to the
politics of abortion, political conservatives have, with moderate success, built a
movement around attacking the methodological grounding of abortion rights
(among others) in a non-originalist and non -textualist approach to interpretation.18
Abandoning the right to privacy liberates progressives simultaneously to support
politically popular and, some would say, morally requisite constitutional claims
such as the rights to contraception and to abortion , while at the same time
distancing themselves from the formless, atextual, and much -maligned right to
privacy.
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the doctrinal migration from
privacy to liberty for other, as-yet unrecognized constitutional rights, particularly
the rights to of same-sex couples to marry and to adopt children and the right of
individuals to purchase and use sex toys. I contend that the change I have
identified argues in favor of constitutional protection for the first two rights and
against protection for the last. That bit of clarity should be welcome, regardless of
one’s views on the rights themselves.

I. The Beginning and End of Privacy Doctrine
I begin with an obituary. This Part traces the right to privacy from its early
years as a key figure in the Warren Court’s cautious embrace of unenumerated
constitutional rights; to its role in creating a right to an abortion; to its gradual
abandonment by its opponents and, eventually, its supporters. The right to privacy
is now dead, I argue, even as its contributions to constitutional law endure.

A. A Right is Born: Griswold v. Connecticut
The right to privacy is polysemous, and it is important to distinguish its
many meanings before proceeding. The same label may refer to the right to
prevent dissemination of one’s name, creative works, or photographic image; to
be free from eavesdropping or physical search by government agents; to associate
with others without unjustified intrusion or exposure by the state; or to exercise

Miller v. Albright, 532 U.S. 420, 441 (1998); Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 132
(1996) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
17
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18
See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEORGETOW N L.J. 657, 672 –690 (2009).
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reproductive or sexual freedom.19 The potential for confusion arises from the fact
that these disparate rights share a common and relatively pedestrian ancestry. As
Justice Black wrote in dissent in Griswold , recognizing a constitutional right of
privacy “appears to be exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in
discussing grounds for tort relief.” 20
When Warren and Brandeis wrote of a right to privacy in their 1890
Harvard Law Review article, they had in mind civil suits against gossip -mongers
and paparazzi, not constitutional defenses against abortion prosecutions.21 Tort
privacy is recognized in nearly every one of the fifty states,2 2 and it is not this
Article’s ambition, nor could it be, to challenge it. Nor do I here call into question
the Fourth Amendment’s continuing protection of one’s “reasonable expectation
of privacy,” however shrinking that expectation might be.23 And the freedom to
associate protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments still presupposes the
right to do so in private. 2 4 Each of these rights to privacy has been tugged at and
remolded in the ordinary course of common-law adjudication, but none has wilted
away.
The right to privacy this Article inters is the one Justice Douglas
announced in his majority opinion in Griswold. The Griswold Court could have
taken any number of doctrinal avenues to strike down Connecticut’s ban on
contraceptives. It could have declared, in harmony with the opinions of Justice
Harlan and Justice White, that the right of a married couple to use contraceptives
is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” that the state’s criminal prohibition
of that use is not sufficiently justified in light of the significance of that right, and
that the Connecticut law therefore violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 5 The Court might have bolstered that view, as Justice
Goldberg urged, by reference to the Ninth Amendment, which provides that “the

19

See Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862, 1884
(2006).
20
Griswold , 381 U.S. at 510 n.1.
21
See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL . L. RE V. 383, 383 –84 (1960).
22
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A. Invasion of privacy encompasses the distinct torts of
“unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, [or] appropriation of the other’s name or
likeness [or] unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life [or] publicity that
unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” Id .
23
See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN . L. RE V. 101, 118 (2008). The phrase of course
comes from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
24
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 –66 (1958); cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334 (1995) (protecting the right to distribute campaign literature anonymously).
25
Griswold , 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); id . at 502 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see
also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.”26
Justice Douglas chose none of the above. He instead married the view,
typically associated with Justice Black, that the Fourteenth Amendment shou ld be
understood to apply the Bill of Rights to the states,27 to his own firmly held view
that “the Bill of Rights is not enough ” and should therefore be interpreted broadly.
Douglas’s Madison Lecture of that title, an apparent response to Justice Black’s
Madison Lecture of three years earlier, lamented the “default of the judiciary, as
respects the Bill of Rights” and the erosion of civil rights by “[j]udge-made
rules.” 28 Privacy is protected by the Bill of Rights, Justice Douglas seemed to say
in Griswold , but not in so many words. The right to privacy is to the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments what the right to association is to the First,
an unspoken implication lying within the Amendment’s interstices and
penumbras.29
Douglas’s initial draft in Griswold did not ground the right of a married
couple to use contraceptives in a right to privacy, and the briefs had not urged a
privacy-based holding. Rather, that first draft had treated the intimacies of the
marital relationship as protected by the First Amendment right of association.3 0 It
is ironic in retrospect that this narrower rationale likely would not have
commanded a majority ,3 1 for “penumbras and emanations” has become an in -joke
around the law schools as shorthand for activist constitutional adjudication, an
invitation for the Court “to protect those activities that enough Justices to form a
majority think ought to be protected and not activities with which they have little
sympathy.”3 2
But the initial criticism of Justice Douglas’s opinio n—and there was
plenty—went less to its promiscuity than to its inscrutability. 33 Privacy has a
common -sense connection to the marital bedroom, but as a doctrinal term of art it
had never been used in quite this way. The Fourth Amendment and the Fifth
Amendment had been understood to protect “privacy” from government
26

U.S. Const. amend. IX, quoted in Griswold , 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
28
William O. Douglas, The Bill of Rights Is Not Enough , 38 N.Y.U. L. RE V. 207, 216, 220 (1963).
29
Griswold , 381 U.S. at 484.
30
See DAVID J. G ARROW , LIBER TY AND SEXU ALITY: THE RIGH T TO PRIVAC Y AND THE M AKING OF
R OE V . WADE 245-46 (1994). The discussion of privacy rights in the final draft was included at the
urging of Justice Brennan. Id . at 246.
31
See id . at 246 -52.
32
ROBER T H. BORK , THE TEM P TING OF AM E RIC A: THE POL ITIC AL SEDUC TION OF THE L AW 99
(1991).
33
It was Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, after all, that took the most open-textured approach
to the due process clause. See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 500 (finding “unacceptable” the majority’s
implication that “the ‘incorporation’ doctrine may be used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process”).
27
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interference for certain purposes, namely on suspicion of untoward activity or to
secure evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution.34 Those protections were of
no use to individuals seeking to avoid the reach of the criminal law altogether,
much less those, like Estelle Griswold and Lee Buxton, who had publicly
advertised their crimes and made no claim of any unwanted physical invasion.35
Easy enough to understand such a right as sounding in liberty, but grounding it in
privacy could well be read as restrictive rather than generative.
B. Privacy’s Adolescence: Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade
As the constitutional right to privacy grew, it became more enigmatic. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird , the Court relied on Griswold to invalidate a Massachusetts
ban on the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people. 36 Baird had been
arrested for giving vaginal foam to an apparently unmarried woman at the close of
a lecture before at least 1500 people at Boston University. 37 Over only one
dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 38 A differently inclined Justice might
have written, “If the right of privacy means anything, it does not license a birthcontrol activist to dole out medical devices to an overflow crowd of college
students.” But by the time of Eisenstadt , “privacy” had become a constitutional
metonym, a word that resonates with the vocabulary of common experience but
carries a more complicated meaning in the pages of the U.S. Reports.
To be fair, the Court was hardly engaged in doublespeak. The privacy
right at issue was in substance the woman’s, not Baird’s, and when we speak of
“private” decisionmaking, we may mean not only that it is physically cached but
that it is closed to external influence or input. In a liberal society , an individual
decision either to risk or to invite pregnancy is simply not the community’s to
make, and there is nothing malapropros in conceiving of that decision as
grounded in a right to privacy. A difficulty arises, however, when the right has to
bear the weight of justification for an exemption from abortion restrictions, as it
did the following year in Roe v. Wade.

34

See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959) (“Certainly it is not necessary to accept
any particular theory of the interrelationship of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to realize what
history makes plain, that it was on the issue of the right to be secure from searches for evidence to
be used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was
fought.”).
35
See GARROW , supra note 30, at 201 –207.
36
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37
See GARROW , supra note 30, at 320.
38
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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Apart from its much -maligned trimester framework, Roe is not a doctrinal
aberration. As Justice Brennan certainly knew, his words in Eisenstadt could as
easily have been describing the right to obtain an abortion.3 9 The Roe Court’s
conclusion—that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but
that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation”—was virtually unassailable as doctrine went.4 0 The
problem was that this doctrine was inadequate to its broader task. The state’s
interest in preserving potential human life is spectacularly weighty, and only an
equally weighty interest could counteract it in a minimally satisfying way. Framed
in privacy terms, the abortion right seems not to outweigh the state’s interest but
to reject it altogether: Asserting a constitutional right to privacy is precisely a
declaration that the state may not legitimately be interested. To be private is, after
all, not to be public. Extending privacy doctrine to abortion thereby abides
conceiving of the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy as a zero -sum duel
between state and wom an, rather than as a respectful weighing of competing but
equally legitimate interests.

C. : Privacy Come Liberty: From Carey to Casey
The Court recognized its mistake, at least implicitly, earlier than is often
though t. With the exception of Carey v. Population Services International, which
applied Griswold to the distribution of contraceptives to minors,4 1 the right to
privacy has not been used to extend constitutional protection to previously
unprotected acts since Roe. Feel free to reread the previous sen tence, because this
fact is easy to lose sight of amid the sequins and pyrotechnics of judicial
confirmation hearings and talk radio. To the extent the Court has expanded the
scope of substantive due process in the decades since Roe, it has generally done
so under the auspices of “liberty,” in harmony with the Griswold opinions of
Justices Harlan and White and, as we will see in Part II, with the longstanding
views of Justice Stevens.
Thus, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Court invalidated a
school board’s policy of requiring unpaid maternity leave for pregnant employees
lasting from five months before their expected delivery date until three months
after the child’s birth.4 2 Justice Stewart, who had joined the Roe majority but had
made clear his distaste for a constitutional right to privacy, 4 3 referred in LaFleur
39

Justice Brennan in fact circulated his Eisenstadt draft, including that momentous sentence, on
the day Roe v. Wade was argued for the first time. See G ARROW , supra note 30, at 541-42.
40
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
41
431 U.S. 678, 691–99(1977).
42
414 U.S. 632 (1974).
43
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 167 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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to “a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion” into the “decision
whether to bear or beget a child,” but he conspicuously avoided any reference to
the word “privacy.” 4 4
Likewise, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland , the Court struck down the
city’s cramped definition of “family” for the purpose of public housing
eligibility .45 Justice Powell’s plurality opinion referenced a longstanding
“freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life” and “a private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter” but did not rely on any right to
privacy as such.46 If there was any doubt that the plurality was self -consciously
distancing itself from the right to privacy, Justice Powell put those doubts to rest
by quoting extensively from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman and
concurrence in Griswold , both of which spoke in terms of liberty rather than
privacy. 47
Later, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote that “the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as
an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment,”4 8 but elsewhere in the
opinion he was careful to note that “[a]lthough many state courts have held that a
right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of
privacy, we have never so held [and] believe this issue is more properly analyzed
in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.” 49 And again, in Troxel v.
Granville, in affirming the right of a mother to refuse visitation to her children’s
paternal grandparents, Justice O’Connor grounded the Court’s decision in liberty
interests and made no reference to a constitutional right to privacy. 50
Whatever might be said of cases like Cruzan and Troxel, the right to
privacy had no better bellwether than Bowers v. Hardwick. For if there is no
privacy right to a consensual, noncommercial sexual relationship in a private
home with the partner of one’s choice, then there is no right deserving of the
44

LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46
Id . at 499. Powell’s reference to a “private realm of family life” derives not from Griswold and
its progeny but from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which upheld application of
the child labor laws of Massachusetts to the niece of a Jehovah’s Witness.
47
Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 -43 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)); id . at 503 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment)); see also id . at 503 n.12 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 551 -52 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent recognized a right to privacy in the home embraced within the
“liberty” protected by the due process clause. Poe, 367 U.S. at 551. But Harlan made clear that the
privacy inherent in the institution of marriage proves a special case for protection that does not
extend, for example, to “adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest, . . . however privately
practiced.” See id . at 552-53.
48
497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
49
Id . at 279 n.7.
50
530 U.S. 57, 65–67(2000).
45
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name. Michael Hardwick was arrested after a police officer happened upon him
engaged in oral sex with another man in his own bedroom.5 1 In his majority
opinion rejecting Hardwick’s claim to constitutional protection, Justice White
said, “We first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with
respondent that the Court’s prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a
right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy and for all intents and
purposes have decided this case.” 5 2 Although the Court of Appeals had indeed
relied on the right to privacy in invalidating the statute,53 Laurence Tribe’s
Supreme Court oral argument on Hardwick’s behalf had made no reference to any
general right to privacy. 5 4 Indeed, at oral argument only Michael Hobbs, counsel
for the state of Georgia, had framed the requested right in constitutional privacy
terms, and he had done so at three different points in his argument.55 Likewise,
the state’s merits brief had mentioned “ the right of privacy ” at every available
opportunity, even using the phrase as the title of a section of the brief, whereas the
respondent’s brief had focused much more on the inadequacy of Georgia’s
purported state interest.5 6 Any right invoked more enthusiastically by its enemies
than its friends is not long for this Earth.
To be sure, Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion opted to “analyze
respondent Hardwick’s claim in the light of the values that underlie the
constitutional right to privacy.” 57 But Justice Blackmun was a jealous guardian of
his opinion in Roe, as made plain by his brooding partial dissent in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,58 and he is perhaps to be
forgiven for missing the writing on the wall.
It was more plain to Justice Stevens, whose Bowers dissent was joined by
each of the other three dissenters, but not Blackmun .59 , The opinion described
51

See JO YCE MURDOCH & DEB PRIC E , COUR TING JUS TICE : G AY MEN AND LESB IANS V . THE
SUP REM E COUR T 277–78 (2001).
52
478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
53
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
54
Transcript of Oral Argument, Bowers, No. 85-140, at 15 –40 (1986).
55
Id . at 5 (“Thus far this Court has concluded that the right of privacy includes marriage and
family, procreation, abortion, child rearing and child education.”), 6 (“The Court has previously
described fundamental rights, whether they be under the general heading of a right of privacy or
other fundamental rights, as those which are so rooted in the conscience of our people as to be
truly fundamental.”), 13 (“As this Court indicated in Roe v. Wade, the right of privacy is not
[absolute].”).
56
Brief of Petitioner at 1, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 34, Bowers, No. 85140 (1986); see Brief of Respondent at 4, Bowers, No. 85-140 (1986).
57
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199.
58
505 U.S. 833, 923 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (“And I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single
vote necessary to extinguish the light.”).
59
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their
physical relationship” as “a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process
Clause.”60 Justice Stevens further stated, “In consideration of claims of this kind,
the Court has emphasized the individual interest in privacy, but its decisions have
actually been animated by an even more fundamental concern.”61 Then, quoting
from his opinion as a Seventh Circuit judge in Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial
Hospital, Justice Stevens evidenced his discomfort with the privacy frame:
“These cases do not deal with the individual’s interest in protection from
unwarranted public attention, comment, or exploitation” but rather “the
individual’s right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect
his own, or his family’s, destiny.”6 2
The right to set one’s own fundamentally significant projects and plans—
in short, to control one’s destiny —has succeeded “privacy” as the limiting frame
for the Court’s substantive due process decisions. Thus, in creatively restating the
holding in Roe, the authors of the Casey joint opinion not only ditched the
trimester framework but stated early in the opinion that “[t]he controlling word in
the cases before us is ‘liberty.’”63 The decision whether to terminate a pregnancy
prior to viability must, we are told, remain the woman’s not because it is none of
the state’s business, but because it is so very much the woman’s: “The destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”64 The right to privacy is mentioned
just twice in the joint opinion, both deep within: first, when the plurality discusses
the informed consent provision of the Pennsylvania statute, which has inherently
to do with information exchange rather than decisionmaking; and second, in
invalidating the spousal notification requirement, where citation to Eisenstadt ’s
admonition that the “privacy” right attaches to the individual rather than to the
marital couple is irresistible. 65 The case is otherwise silent on the right to privacy.
60

Id . at 216.
Id . at 217.
62
Id .
63
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
64
Id . at 852.
65
Id . at 883, 896. Unsurprisingly, we see far more overt references of the right to privacy in the
Casey dissents. See generally Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 M INN. L. RE V. 1103, 1109
(2004) (“Justice Blackmun’s opinion is almost poignant in its repeated use of ‘privacy,’ as if he
could resuscitate the Griswold-Roe formulation by simply declaring that the majority was using
it.”) Justice Blackmun wrote that the joint opinion “reaffirms the long recognized right[]of
privacy,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part), he described the ways in which “[s]tate restrictions on abortion
violate a woman’s right of privacy,” id . at 927, and he argued that state abortion restrictions
“deprive[] a woman of the right to make her own decision about . . . critical life choices that this
Court has long deemed central to the right to privacy,” id .; see also id . at 929 (“The Court has held
that limitations on the right of privacy are permissible only if they survive ‘strict’ constitutional
61
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D. The End of Privacy: Lawrence and Carhart
Given the fault lines on the Rehnquist Court, it was clear that virtually any
majority opinion in a contested substantive due process case would require the
agreement of at least two of the three authors of the Casey joint opinion —Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. So when the Court finally reversed Bowers with
its 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, it should not have been surprising that
Justice Kennedy, echoing his own words in Casey, eschewed the language of
privacy rights. 6 6 The word “privacy” appears just thrice in the majority opinion: in
restating the question presented, in restating the holding of Griswold , and in a
verbatim quote from Eisenstadt .67 By contrast, the word “liberty” appears more
than twenty -five times in the majority opinion, including three times in the
opening paragraph:68
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State
is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives
and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.69
From the beginning, one of the knocks on the right of privacy was that the
Griswold Court “did not even intimate an answer to the question, ‘Privacy to do
what?’”70 “Liberty” may not be inherently better suited to answer that question,
but it does at least invite conversation about the substance of the protected
conduct rather than its location or circumstances—its “spatial bounds,” so to
scrutiny.”). Chief Justice Rehnquist, purporting to respond to the joint opinion, nonetheless framed
his argument around a proposition that the joint opinion did not contest: that the Court’s
substantive due process cases through Eisenstadt “do not endorse any all-encompassing ‘right of
privacy.’” Id . at 951 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
This disjunction may result from the fact that Rehnquist drafted his Casey opinion on the
assumption that he was writing for a majority, unaware that the joint opinion was imminent. See
LIND A GREENHOU SE , BECOM ING JUS TICE BL ACKM UN 203 (2005).
66
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
67
Id . at 564, 565.
68
See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in C ATO
SUP . CT . RE V., 2002-2003, at 21, 34 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003); Hunter, supra note 65 , at
1106.
69
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
70
BORK , supra note 32, at 99.
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speak. Justice Kennedy is hinting at a freedom of self-definition, which is at least
a principle, if a question -begging one. Accordingly, the Bowers dissent Justice
Kennedy finds most fertile for his purposes is that of Justice Stevens, not Justice
Blackmun. Kennedy writes, “Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have
been controlling in Bowers and should control here.”7 1
Lawrence was, overtly, paradoxically, a mortal blow to the constitutional
right to privacy, 7 2 but the final nail in its coffin was more subtle. In Gonzales v.
Carhart , the Court rejected a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003, a federal prohibition on what is professionally known as the intact
dilation and evacuation method of terminating a pregnancy, even though the act
did not include an exception for the preservation of maternal health. 73 The Court
split 5–4, and Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. The Carhart dissent therefore represented
the views of the Justices most likely to be sympathetic to a right to privacy. But
earlier in her career, as a Court of Appeals judge, Ginsburg had said that the Roe
Court “presented an incomplete justification for its action.” 74 She would have
preferred the majority in Roe to have “added a distinct sex discrimination theme
to its medically oriented opinion .”75 Referring more to women’s equality would
have recognized that, because of the social expectations that attend pregnancy,
childbirth, and child-rearing, “[a]lso in the balance [in abortion cases] is a
woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s course— . . . her ability to stand in
relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal
citizen.” 76
Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent, her first significant abortion opinion in
fourteen years on the Court, picked up where she had left off more than two
decades earlier. “As Casey comprehended,” she wrote in Carhart , “at stake in
cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s ‘control over her [own]
destiny.’ . . . Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures
do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on
a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal
citizenship stature.”77 The commingling of equality and liberty interests also

71

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
Cf. Hunter, supra note 65 , at 1106 (“It would certainly be ironic if Lawrence marked the end of
a right of privacy in formal constitutional taxonomy.”).
73
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
74
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C. L. RE V. 375, 376 (1985).
75
Id . at 383.
76
Id ..
77
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 171-72. A doctrinal shift away from constitutional privacy is also
welcomed by those who see in a right to privacy the implication that domestic violence is not or
72
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appeared in Lawrence, in which Justice Kennedy said that “[e]quality of treatment
and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a d ecision on
the latter point advances both interests.”78 On this conception, the liberty
component of substantive due process protects an individual’s right to make
fundamental life decisions on substantively equal terms with others.
Referring to the Court’s substantive due process cases through Carey,
Justice White wrote in Bowers that “none of the rights announced in those cases
bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.”79 Justice Kennedy in
Lawrence and Justice Ginsburg in Carhart made clear that five members of the
Court have settled on a nexus, and it is grounded not in privacy but in liberty and
equality. Indeed, as we shall see in Part III, the only members of the current Court
likely to refer to the right to privacy are those who dissent either from its
fecundity or its very existence. The next Part discusses the role played by Justice
Stevens in that remarkable doctrinal evolution.
II. Justice Stevens and the Liberty Clause
As a naval intelligence officer during World War II, John Paul Stevens
was part of a team charged with deciphering the Japanese naval code.80
Cryptanalysis requires the codebreaker to unlock the ciphering system that
identifies the relevant numeric codes and then to translate those codes into
words.8 1 A coding system must by necessity be mysterious to outsiders, but it
must at the same time be transparent to insiders. Code—good code, anyway —is
designed to be understood. Indeed, that’s the key to cracking it. 8 2
Law, too, is a kind of code, and it can be mysterious to the uninitiated.I
have discussed the ways in which the right to privacy was put to work beyond its
talents. This Part discusses Justice Stevens’s recognition that, circa 1975,
constitutional privacy doctrine was in need of a better idiom . Section A articulates
Justice Stevens’s vision of liberty, which was, like Justice Harlan’s and Justice
White’s, more grounded conceptually but at the same time more generative than

should not be a legitimate concern of the State. See, e.g., ELIZ ABE TH SCHNE IDER , B ATTERED
WOM EN AND FEM IN IS T L AW M AK ING 87-100 (2000).
78
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
79
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 -92.
80
See Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens: Human Rights Judge, 74 FORDHAM L. RE V . 1569,
1580 (2006).
81
See MICH AEL SM ITH , TH E EM P EROR ’S CODES : THE BRE AK ING OF J AP AN ’S SECR E T CIP HERS 59–
60 (2000).
82
See id .

14

Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, Forthcoming, U.C. Davis Law Review

privacy. Section B then explains how Justice Stevens’s conception of liberty has
indeed generated doctrine consistent with his substantive constitutional views.

A. Justice Stevens and the Liberty Clause
In trying to bridge the divide between Justice Black and Justice Harlan,
Justice Douglas had created a paradox: an unenumerated right grounded in
positive law. Such rights are not unknown to constitutional law, as Justice
Douglas sought to demonstrate with his reference in Griswold to the right of
association, which lives in the long shadow of the First Amendment.83 But as such
rights expand into realms not originally contemplated by their begetters, and not
welcomed by their detractors, they become too easy a target to sustain a
controversial doctrine. Abortion rights do not sound in privacy. That does not
mean, of course, that such rights do not deserve constitutional protection, but
having to speak in the language of privacy unduly complicates the task of those
who would defend them.
Then-Judge John Paul Stevens, a Nixon appointee to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, faced the paradox of constitutional privacy in full
form in 1975, when he had before him a case in which several married couples
sued for paternal access to the delivery room of a public hospital during the birth
of their children. 8 4 The plaintiffs were claiming a privacy right, not to preclude
state access to an intimate event or decision, but to obtain it for themselves; the
state’s presence was not only conceded as legitimate but was in fact invited. This
was all profoundly weird, and Judge Stevens effectively said so:
It is somewhat unfortunate that claims of this kind tend to be
classified as assertions of a right to privacy. For the group of cases that
lend support to plaintiffs’ position do not rest on the same privacy concept
that Brandeis and Warren identified in their article in the 1890 Edition of
the Harvard Law Review.85
Significantly, however, in distancing himself from the right to privacy, Judge
Stevens did not retreat to the strict formalist position associated with Justices
Black and Stewart in Griswold .86 Rather, Stevens laid out an affirmative vision of
83

See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 483.
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
85
Id . at 719.
86
See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I like my privacy as well as the next one,
but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited
by some specific constitutional provision.”); id . at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“I think this is an
uncommonly silly law. . . . But we are not asked in this case to say whether this law is unwise, or
even asinine.”).
84
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constitutional liberty that is tethered neither to the concept of privacy nor to any
formula dictated by the Constitution’s text. Referring to Griswold , Eisenstadt , and
Roe, he said, “The character of the Court’s language in these cases brings to mind
the origins of the American heritage of freedom —the abiding interest in
individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s right to
decide how he will live his own life intolerable.” 87
This should sound familiar, of course, since it approximates the Court’s
current doctrine. As Part I discusses above, Justice Stevens wrote his Fitzgerald
opinion into the U.S. Reports in his Bowers dissent, and Justice Kennedy in turn
relied on that dissent for the majority in Lawrence. Crucially, Justice Stevens’s
formulation is no more restraining than Justice Douglas’s or Justice Blackmun’s,
and it is in some respects less so. In Fit zgerald he quoted Justice Harlan’s
statement in Griswold:

Judicial self-restraint will not . . . be brought about in the ‘due
process’ area by the historically unfounded incorporation formula
advanced by [Black and Stewart]. It will be achieved in this area, as in
other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the
teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and
preserving American freedoms.88
One is reminded of Justice Sutherland’s statement, dissenting in West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish , that “[s]elf-restraint belongs in the domain of will and not of
judgment.”8 9 A belief that judicial restraint is a constitutional value, but an
endogenous one, enables Justice Stevens to be comfortable taking the
constitutional term “liberty” at face value, as the freedom to follow the dictates of
one’s conscience bound only by the competing needs of a reasonable sovereign. 90

87

Fitzgerald, 523 F.2d at 719 -20.
Fitzgerald, 523 F.2d at 719 n.14 (quoting 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
89
300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
90
See John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. RE V. 13, 37-38
(1992) (“‘Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary.” (quoting Whitney v. California, 275 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring))); cf. John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MIAM I L. R E V. 277, 280
(1986) (“It is quite wrong . . . to assume that regulation and liberty occupy mutually exclusive
zones—that as one expands, the other must contract. . . . [O]ne of the inner complexities of the
concept of liberty is that the application of coercive governmental power may enlarge the sphere
of liberty.”).
88
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Justice Stevens made the point more explicitly in his dissenting opinion in
Meachum v. Fano , in which the Court held that prison inmates have no
constitutional liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a prison facility with
materially worse conditions.91 Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s implication
that a protected liberty interest must originate either in the Constitution or in a
statute. Stevens wrote:
If man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be correct.
But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the
liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional
provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the
liberty of the citizen. The relevant state laws either create property rights,
or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who must live in an ordered
society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of
individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source of liberty,
and surely not the exclusive source. 92
Like Justice Harlan and Justice White before him, Justice Stevens countered
Douglas’s expansive positivism with a careful naturalism. 93 Rather than
protecting an unenumerated right grounded in positive law, Justice Stevens’s due
process clause—what he has called the “liberty clause”—protected an enumerated
right grounded in natural law.

B. Reaching the Right Side of History
Quite unlike Harlan’s or White’s, however, Stevens’s substantive views
on the reach of the due process clause have carried the day.94 Harlan intimated in
Poe v. Ullman that the moral judgments of the community may justify State
prohibitions on, for example, “adultery, fornication and homosexual practices.”95
That is very nearly the opposite of the position Justice Stevens espoused in his
Bowers dissent, and which Justice Kennedy in Lawrence lifted verbatim from
Justice Stevens: “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
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427 U.S. 215, 223–229 (1976).
Id . at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93
Upon White’s retirement from the Court, Justice Stevens wrote that White’s opinion in
Griswold “squarely and correctly rested its conclusion that the statutory prohibition against the use
of contraceptives was unconstitutional on the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” John
Paul Stevens, “Cheers!” A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 1994 B.Y.U. L. RE V. 209, 213.
94
See Stevens, supra note 90, at 20.
92

95

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

17

Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, Forthcoming, U.C. Davis Law Review

law prohibiting the practice.” 96 And although Harlan left the Court two months
before (and died two weeks after) Roe was argued, Charles Fried, who drafted
Poe, suggests quite plausibly that “[t]he argumentation of Harlan’s dissent in
[ Poe], as well as his refusal to condemn laws proscribing adultery, fornication,
and homosexuality leave little doubt that he would have held with the dissenters
in Roe.”97 For his part, Justice White of course dissented in Roe and wrote the
now-discredited majority opinion in Bowers. 98
It is difficult to know what gives one judge a better eye for doctrinal
progression than another. I want to suggest, though, that crucial to Justice
Stevens’s conception of constitutional liberty is an appreciation for its connection
to equality, and a law sense that enables him to follow their respective arcs where
they lead him. As I discuss above, a majority of the current Court has come to the
view that denial of certain particularly significant liberty interests inexorably
effects a denial of equal protection of the laws.99 Restricting a woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy subjects her body and her subsequent life to a set of
physical and social burdens that cannot befall a man. Denying someone the right
to sexual intimacy with the partner of his choice denies him a choice that he may
consider central to his humanity, and that others not so denied consider central to
theirs.
Conversely, denying an individual certain public benefits on an arb itrary
basis, such as the color of her skin , denies her a liberty interest without sufficient
justification. That, as Justice Stevens has noted, was the basis for the Court’s
96

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan , 36 N.Y.L.S. L. RE V. 33, 52 n.121 (1991)
(citation omitted); see also Poe, 367 U.S. at 547 (“Certainly, Connecticut’s judgment [as to
contraception] is no more demonstrably correct or incorrect than are the varieties of judgment,
expressed in law, on marriage and divorce, on adult consensual homosexuality, abortion, and
sterilization, or euthanasia and suicide.”). Unlike the Connecticut law banning contraceptive use,
there was a long history of anti-abortion regulations leading up to Roe. See id . at 554
(“[C]onclusive, in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactment. Although the Federal
Government and many States have at one time or other had on their books statutes forbidding or
regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has made the use of
contraceptives a crime.”). Of course, Justice Harlan’s views in 1961 cannot be presumed to be the
same as what they would have been in 1973. See generally John Paul Stevens, Learning on the
Job , 74 FORDHAM L. RE V. 1561 (2006). Harlan was a firm believer, moreover, in the capacity of
constitutional protections to evolve with society. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference
to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has
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living thing.”).
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Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986).
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See Section I.D, supra .
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decision in Bolling v. Sharpe.1 00 “The self-evident proposition enshrined in the
Declaration [of Independence]—the proposition that all men are created equal—is
not merely an aspect of social policy that judges are free to accept or reject,” he
told a University of Chicago Law School audience in 1991. “It is a matter of
principle that is so firmly grounded in the ‘traditions of our people’ that it is
properly viewed as a component of the liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendment.”10 1 On this view the equal protection clause and the due process
clause are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. 102
Linking the liberty interests in obtaining an abortion or in engaging in
homosexual conduct to the constitutional equality concerns that they implicate
would not likely have impressed Justice Harlan. The equal protection clause was
first applied to sex discrimination in Reed v. Reed , 103 which was argued the month
after Harlan retired from the Court. No Court majority was willing even to apply
heightened scrutiny to sex discrimination until 1976, five years after Harlan’s
death.104 It was not that the Court just hadn’t gotten around to reaching such
claims or applying such standards; rather the same women’s movement that
pushed passage of the Equal Rights Amendment altered the cultural landscape
and, consequently, the Court’s case law in the 1970s. 1 05 Justice Harlan authored
the Court’s unanimous opinion in Hoyt v. Florida , which upheld Florida’s
practice of presumptively excluding women from jury service on the ground that
“woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.” 106 Questioning an
abortion ban on sex equality grounds would have been an impossibly difficult
leap for him.
Likewise, Justice Harlan did not live to see the full flowering of the gay
rights movement. Although the Warren Court did not have much opportunity to
confront gay rights issues, we get a glimpse of Justice Harlan’s attitude towards
gays in Manual Enterprises v. Day, in which the Court reversed the Post Office
Department’s determination that a number of gay soft porn magazines were
obscene.1 07 Writing only for himself and for Justice Stewart, Justice Harlan
announced the opinion of the Court but wrote gratuitously that the magazines
100
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were “dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry” and described their readers as
“unfortunate persons.”10 8 At the time of Harlan’s death, gays and lesbians were
not only subject to anti-sodomy laws in many states but they remained ineligible
for federal civil service employment.109 In a due process challenge to that
exclusion in 1960, the Court had denied cert without any internal dissent.110 Five
years after Harlan’s death, the Court summarily affirmed —without merits briefing
or oral argument—the denial of a challenge to Virginia’s sodomy ban.111 Three
Justices indicated that they would have noted probable jurisdiction and scheduled
the case for oral argument: Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice
Stevens.11 2
It may be surprising that a well-bred Republican antitrust lawyer would be
so responsive to the sexual revolution, but Justice Stevens’ writings on and off the
bench have long emphasized a judge’s capacity for change. At a symposium on
his career hosted by Fordham Law School in 2005, Justice Stevens said that
“learning on the job is essential to the process of judging.” 1 13 He has explained,
for example, that when he first became a federal judge, he believed that the due
process clause “provides procedural safeguards, but has no substantive
[content].”11 4 He changed his view after rereading the opinions of Justice Holmes
in Lochner v. New York1 1 5 and Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California.116
Justice Stevens has also said that careful examination of the relevant precedents
and arguments likewise changed his view over whether political patronage in civil
service violated the First Amendment.1 17 Witness as well his transformation into a
death penalty abolitionist, 118 a generation after co -authoring the controlling
opinion in Gregg v. Georgia , which lifted the Court’s nationwide moratorium and
announced, inter alia, that “the punishment of death does not invariably violate
the Constitution.”11 9 Instead of assuming that that view must be true for all time,
Justice Stevens in Baze v. Rees “relied on [his] own experience” in concluding
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that the death penalty has become cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.1 20
Like a conscientious jurist, law itself can change as the society that
sustains it grows older and wiser. Justice Stevens’ confidence in that quality
underwrites his lack of formalism. Unlike Justice White, for example, Justice
Stevens has long insisted that the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis that remains a feature
of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence too rigidly describes the proper
analysis. 1 21 Lacking the formalist’s preference for clear rules likewise, I think, has
sensitized Justice Stevens to the interdoctrinal overlay that drives his view of the
importance of liberty to equality, and vice versa. A judge who believes there is, in
effect, more than one equal protection clause is bound to have a difficult time in
seeing which one dovetails with the due process clause, and how.12 2 By contrast,
Justice Stevens can approach his task unburdened by any compulsion to maintain
sharp cleavages between doctrinal areas and self-conscious about the need to be
receptive to new arguments and perspectives. It is perhaps more accurate, then, to
say that his responsiveness to the claims of the sexual revolution is not in spite of
his background as a well-bred Republican antitrust lawyer, but is rather because
of it.

III. The Politics of Privacy
The decaying of the right to privacy described in Part I and effectively
presaged by Justice Stevens as early as 1975 has gone largely unnoticed in our
constitutional politics. At the 2006 Supreme Court nomination hearing of Justice
Alito, the very first question he was asked, by Senator Specter, was whether “the
Liberty Clause and the Constitution carries with it the right to privacy.” 12 3 At
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Chief Justice Roberts’s hearing months earlier, Senators Specter, Biden, Kohl,
Schumer, and Feinstein all asked Roberts whether he believed in a constitutional
right to privacy; Biden and Schumer asked the same question in two separate
rounds of questioning.1 2 4 Senator Specter opened the hearing by confronting
Roberts with a memo Roberts had written in 1981 as an attorney in the Justice
Department in which he had referred to the “so-called ‘right to privacy.’”125
Both Roberts and Alito answered that there is a right to privacy in the
Constitution deriving from Griswold , even though I have suggested that Lawrence
v. Texas effectively marked constitutional privacy’s doctrinal end. That doesn’t
mean Roberts and Alito were necessarily wrong. Both men surely recognized that
the questions they were being asked were not doctrinal but political. In the latter
realm, of course, describing oneself as opposed to the right to privacy is but
shorthand for declaring one’s hostility to the constitutional right to an abortion.
That is so even if, in the realm of doctrine, the abortion right is no longer
conditioned on a right to privacy. A judge who describes herself as opposed to the
right to privacy also risks the demonization that befell Robert Bork in 1987. Try
as he did to argue, in the way of many academics, that the Connecticut ban on
contraceptive use might have been struck down on desuetude or some other
ground, Bork’s rejection of the right to privacy is widely viewed as having
doomed his nomination.126 His was a fate Roberts and Alito were doubtless eager
to avoid.
The Bork nomination demonstrated that disclaiming a right to privacy was
no way to ingratiate oneself with certain segments of the public. But just as
surely, applying the “so -called” label signals fraternity with many of the rest,
becoming something of a secret handshake on the right. 127 The “so -called”
formulation boasts a distinguished pedigree within conservative legal circles: it
was used not only by Roberts in that 1981 memo, but by the Reagan Justice
Department in its 1988 Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation ;1 28 by Scalia in his
dissenting opinion in Lawrence;129 and by Federalist Society co -founder Steven
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Calabresi in his introduction to a volume on the history of the originalism
debate.1 30
The label had more humble beginnings. The formulation appears to have
first been used by New York Court of Appeals judge Alton Parker in the case of
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company.131 Abigail Marie Roberson’s claim
had nothing to do with contraception, abortion, or sexual intimacy. Rather, she
wanted equitable relief and damages for the unauthorized use of her likeness—
“said to be a very good one”—in an advertisement for Franklin Mills Flour.132
Referring to the celebrated Warren and Brandeis article, Judge Parker
dismissively wrote that “[t]he so -called right to privacy is . . . founded upon the
claim that a man has the right to pass through this world . . . without having his
picture published, his business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments
written up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented upon . . . .”133
Roberson lost, but the (so -called) “so -called right to privacy” has since peppered
the opinions of state and federal courts. Nearly all such references echo that of
Prosser and Keeton, who speak of “the so -called ‘right of privacy’” in the context
of unwanted publicity or commercial exploitation rather than immunity from state
morals legislation. 134
The strange career of the right to privacy may suggest an amendment to
Robert Dahl’s famous observation that “the policy views dominant on the Court
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the
lawmaking majorities of the United States.” 13 5 Dahl’s suggestion is that the
political branches have a certain corrective capacity that makes the legal doctrine
of the Court tend to follow the political predilections of majorities rather than
those of minorities. But defenses of the right to privacy show a converse order of
influence. Biden’s belief “with every fiber of [his] being” in a general right to
privacy is one that he shares with perhaps no one on the Court.136 The Court
invented, and then abandoned, the right to privacy, but its initial use as a
justification for politically relevant doctrine nominated it as a litmus test in the
politics of the confirmation process. Its potency as such a test makes it insensitive
to the Court’s doctrinal evolution. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have argued
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that political parties change positive constitutional law over time by using the
appointments process to effect what Balkin and Levinson call “partisan
entrenchment.”13 7 Certain doctrinal formulae and rhetoric, such as the right to
privacy, can likewise influence constitutional politics through what one might call
doctrinal entrenchment. Confirmation fights are prime locales for both forms of
entrenchment: a judicial formulation can infest the politics of judging every bit as
much as a President’s politics can take over the Court.
There are good reasons, however, for progressives to take the Court’s
more recent cues on the right to privacy. I have argued that the right to privacy
faces certain rhetorical challenges in justifying a right to abo rtion.1 38 Those
challenges are more acute in the current methodological climate on the Court and
within the legal academy. Consider the words of Chief Justice Roberts at the
Rehnquist Center Lecture at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College
of Law:
When Justice Rehnquist came onto the Court, I think it’s fair to say
that the practice of constitutional law—how constitutional law was
made—was more fluid and wide-ranging than it is today, more in the
realm of political science. . . . Now, over Justice Rehnquist’s time on the
Court, the method of analysis and argument shifted to the more solid
grounds of legal arguments—what are the texts of the statutes involved,
what precedents control.13 9

Roberts’ s perspective is somewhat hortatory, but it is safe to say that the Court,
and the legal and academic discourses that encircle it, are less hospitable than they
once were to non -textual arguments.140 The transformation of sexual intimacy and
abortion from privacy to liberty rights accommodates politically popular liberal
demands for a progressive Constitution with legally ascendant conservative
demands for one whose text is authoritative. 14 1
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It was Justice Douglas’ s aim to ground the substantive due process right to
use contraceptives more firmly in the text of the Bill of Rights than Justice Harlan
or Justice White would have it, but he failed to do so. “Liberty” is hardly selfdefining, but it can boast three appearances in the Constitution, including in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments142 —that’s of course three more than
“privacy.”14 3 A case like Lawrence, then, was not an example of finding a new
right in the Constitution but rather defining an ancient and enumerated one.
Justice Stevens makes that point to great rhetorical effect in Meachum v. Fano : “I
had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with
liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the
Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges
conferred by specific laws or regulations.”14 4

IV. The Long Arm of Liberty
It might be objected that all I have said is merely semantics. That it is
naive to imagine that the labels judges apply to doctrine drives the results in
actual cases. That this is so much inside baseball, and the actual winning and
losing is responsive to other discourses. An article of this scope is not the place to
stake out and defend a position in the great debates over the elements of judicial
decisionmaking. If doctrinal labels are nothing more, then the internment of the
privacy label remains a point worth making. Nonetheless, I do believe that more
can be said. Whether the Court is hospitable to certain substantive claims seems to
depend in significant part on the work that is done to change the language in
which the Court speaks. The decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, striking
down the District’s handgun ban, required that the profile and credibility of
originalism be enhanced.1 45 The decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 , invalidating voluntary public school
integration plans in Seattle and Louisville, required a makeover of the idea of a
color-blind Constitution.146 More than any other public institution, the Court’s
word is its bond; it takes language—of statutes, of regulations, of its own prior
opinions—seriously, more seriously perhaps than language is usually meant to be
taken. Referring to a potential class of rights as deriving from liberty rather than
142

The Constitution’s other reference to liberty is in the Preamble.
Of course, the text of the Constitution appears to modern readers to give solely procedural, and
not substantive protections to individual liberty. This is an obstacle for textualists, but surely
easier to surmount than the complete absence of the word “privacy” from the document.
144
427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); see Greene, supra note 18, at ___; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. RE V. 191 (2008).
146
551 U.S. 701 (2007); see id . at (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is my firm conviction that no
Member of the Court I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision.”).
143

25

Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, Forthcoming, U.C. Davis Law Review

privacy is not merely cosmetic. The limited doctrinal reach of privacy, as I have
endeavored to show, reflects the limitations of language itself.
Going forward, the shift in language I have identified might carry
consequences for three of the most active doctrinal areas falling under the rubric
of substantive due process: marriage rights for same-sex couples, adoption by
gays and lesbians, and the purchase and use of sex toys. Although the
constitutional right to privacy has its origins in the desire to protect the institution
of marriage from state interference, the language of privacy rights is an
exceptionally poor fit for extending constitutional protection to same-sex
marriage. Marriage is a quintessentially public institution —the notoriety of the
commitment is a source of its symbolic gravity. As Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health , the case requiring legal recognition of same-sex marriage in
Massachusetts, “marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another
human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality,
companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.” 1 47 Just as the deeply felt public
interest in abortion makes “privacy” a non -starter for many abortion rights
opponents, reliance on privacy interests to extend constitutional marriage rights to
same-sex couples would give opponents an inviting target for criticism.
Likewise, resorting to a privacy rubric to defend the rights of gays and
lesbians to adopt children is too easily characterized as discounting—rather than
overcoming—the traditional public concern for the best interests of the child,
particularly one in the state’s care. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Lofton v. Secretary of
the Department of Children and Family Services, in which the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida’s ban on adoption by “homosexual[s],”
raised a marital privacy claim and were rebuffed precisely on the ground that
adoption is inherently a public affair. 148 Judge Birch wrote:
The decision to adopt a child is not a private one, but a public act.
At a minimum, would -be adoptive parents are asking the state to confer
official recognition . . . on a relationship where there exists no natural filial
bond. In many cases they are also asking the state to entrust into their
permanent care a child for whom the state is currently serving as in loco
parentis. In doing so, these prospective adoptive parents are electing to
open their homes and their private lives to close scrutiny by the state.14 9
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In the absence of Griswold and its progeny, no one would think to argue that the
right to legal adoption presupposes state indifference to the fitness of the
prospective parents. But the privacy rationale encourages that distracting line of
argument, to the detriment of the equality rights of gays and lesbians.
Focusing instead on liberty, and by extension on equality, is no guarantee
of success, and in Lofton it was no more successful than the privacy argument.150
But a conversation about equality in marriage or family planning invokes an
interest that is both compelling and, unlike the right to privacy, exogenous to the
interest of the state. Even the most monumental of interests in state intervention
must still remain competitive with the independent mandate to treat persons
equally in matters of fundamental importance. Adoption and marriage may never
sound in privacy. But the Constitution’s words do not admit limitation to the
prejudices of any particular age. Over time, as society evolves—and judges, too—
it may come to be axiomatic that any reasonable conception of equality must
overcome the speculations of public officials bearing social theories. 151
On a third active substantive due process issue, the right to purchase and
use sex toys, the shift from privacy to liberty offers far less comfort. There is
currently a circuit split over whether a state may ban the sale of sexual
gratification devices, with the Eleventh Circuit upholding Georgia’s ban under
rational basis review and the Fifth Circuit invalidating Texas’s prohibition
without specifying a level of scrutiny .1 52 Both panels assumed without discussion
that the same analysis applies to a ban on sale as would apply to a ban on use.
Unlike same-sex marriage or gay adoption, a right to sex-toy use fits comfortably
within the rubric of privacy. If there is a constitutional right to use sex toys, it is
very likely because the state has no legitimate business regulating, as such, the
means through which its constituents reach orgasm .1 53 By contrast, extending the
liberty right recognized in Casey and in Lawrence to the right to use sex toys
threatens to trivialize it, and thereby unwittingly to undermine efforts to protect
same-sex marriage and adoption rights. 154 Whatever the merits of the three rights,
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our law, and our legal discourse, will benefit from recognizing that they attach to
distinct sets of interests.
Conclusion

The right to privacy has what a PR man would call bad optics. 155 It is
missing from the text of the Constitution; it is freighted with the baggage of terms
like “penumbras” and “emanations;” and it seems at first blush to bear little
relationship to some of the specific rights with which it has been associated, such
as abortion and same-sex marriage. Justice Stevens saw as much a quarter-century
ago, when he wrote for a panel of the Seventh Circuit that privacy was an
“unfortunate” label for the set of decisional rights warranting protection under
what he has called the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the years
since, Justice Stevens has played no small role in nudging the Court itself toward
the same view. The Justices supporting the rights to abortion and sexual intimacy
no longer speak in terms of privacy but instead, like Justice Stevens, affiliate
those rights with an individual’s interest in control of her destiny. Justice Stevens
and the Court have both recognized that interest as sounding in liberty and
equality alike.
Retiring the right to privacy may have salutary effects on the framing of
marriage and adoption rights for gays and lesbian s, but both liberals and
conservatives perceive political benefits in its continued service. Losing privacy
would deprive conservatives of a favorite bogeyman and, in the eyes of many
liberals, would endanger the right to an abortion. But just as doctrine must change
to accommodate our politics, politics must sometimes change to accommodate the
Court’s doctrine. And so, eventually, it will.
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